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THREE LETTERS

TO

Lieut. Gen. Sir WILLIAM HOWE.

[Price One Shilling.]

22

THREE LETTERS

TO

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL

SIR WILLIAM HOWE.

WITH AN

APPENDIX.

By Israel Mauduit.

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THREE LETTERS

TO

Lieut. Gen. Sir WILLIAM HOWE.

LETTER I.

SIR,

FROM Mr. Kirk's letter to you and your anſwer, it appears, that previous to your election for Nottingham, you had ſecretly declared to your conſtituents your good opinion of the American cauſe, and that you thought the miniſtry had puſhed the matter too far; and had ſolemnly promiſed, that, if you ſhould be appointed, you would not accept of a command againſt their American brethren. In excuſe for the direct breach of your faith, you tell them, that *inſtead of the groſſeſt abuſe, like theirs, who wiſhed you to fall in America, you had been moſt highly complimented*

upon the occaſion, by thoſe who were even averſe to the meaſures of adminiſtration. In the delicate nature of our affairs, you go on, WHATEVER OPPROBRIOUS NAMES I MAY BE CALLED BY AT NOTTINGHAM, I AM ENCOURAGED TO SAY, THAT NO SUCH EPITHETS WILL BE PUT TO IT IN ANY OTHER QUARTER. Under this total eclipſe of grammar, Mr. Kirk might perhaps gueſs your meaning: that he muſt not be angry with you: for their party had encouraged you to accept of the command. The terms of this acceptance might perhaps be too *delicate* an affair to be farther explained: but is it poſſible, Sir, to ſuppoſe, that the party who had publicly declared, *that they thought the Americans in the right, and that they wiſhed and prayed for their ſucceſs*; that that party who knew that the ſubduing of the rebellion would prove, that the matter had not been puſh'd too far; and, by fixing the miniſtry in the good opinion of the nation, would for ever extinguiſh their hope of ſupplanting them: is it poſſible to ſuppoſe that theſe men would have encouraged, and ſo highly complimented you, upon your accepting the command, if they thought that you really intended to ſubdue the rebellion, and thereby ruin all their hopes?

Whether any, and what aſſurances were given, can only be known by yourſelf and the party, which at firſt encouraged you to accept of the command, and have ſince ſo zealouſly taken up the defence of your conduct in it. What the party thought of you, may be judged by a ſpeech

of

of a noble Duke who took the lead in oppoſition then, and has been your principal defender ever ſince: *I have no apprehenſions from General Howe's taking the command: he is one of us, and will do the Americans no harm.* How much ſoever, Sir, you may have admitted him into your confidence, you was not much obliged to him for revealing it: yet I can name the perſon to whom he ſaid it.--- There is a ſtory too of another letter of your own, in which you more explicitly ſpeak your intention, and ſay: I will waite—waite—waite.

But, Sir, we need look no farther than this firſt letter, to diſcover the extreme duplicity of your views. After having told your conſtituents, that you had accepted the command with the approbation of their friends in oppoſition, YOU INTREAT THEM THEREFORE TO SUSPEND THEIR JUDGMENT IN THESE MATTERS, UNTIL THE EVENT PROVES YOU UNWORTHY OF THEIR SUPPORT.

Here, Sir, it is impoſſible for us not to aſk, what could be the meaning of your having accepted the command, with the approbation of the oppoſition, who wiſhed ſucceſs to the Americans? and in what manner muſt you have intended to execute that command, ſo as to hope to prove yourſelf worthy of your conſtituents ſupport?— It could not be by obeying the King's commiſſion, and making a *real* war to ſubdue the rebellion: for you knew, that that was a war againſt their *American brethren*, in which, far from wiſhing you

ſucceſs, they wiſhed you might be ſhot, if you attempted it.

In what light then muſt the public contemplate you? You had pledged your faith to your Sovereign and your country by accepting the command; your confidents in oppoſition, who had decalred for the Americans, approved of your accepting the command; and you hoped to gain the future ſupport of your conſtituents, which you knew could only be obtained by betraying that command, and by not ſubduing the rebellion. Theſe are queſtions, Sir, which naturally ariſe out of your own letter, and to which the nation has a right to require an anſwer; more ſatisfactory *than* moſt of the reaſonings in your narrative.

But, Sir, far from being aſhamed of its having been diſcovered that you ſet out with a bad opinion of the cauſe for which you undertook to fight, you now at your return from your four years command, avow the ſame ſentiments; and after having ſeen ſo many inſtances of the rebels perfidy; after their declaration of independence (which your party kept denying to the very laſt that they ever intended;) and after their leaguing with France for our deſtruction; after all this, you now open your Narrative with manifeſtly intimating, that you ſtill think the war, of which you accepted the command, *impolitic and unjuſt*.

And was you then, Sir, ſuch a mere ſoldier of fortune, as to accept of a command to fight againſt that cauſe which you thought had juſtice on its ſide?

If

If you did ſet out ſo unprincipled a commander, what ground then does this give us for doubting, and by what rule ſhall we determine, whether from the beginning you meant to be true to your Sovereign, and betray and ruin your party; or whether you meant to be true to what you thought to be the cauſe of juſtice, and knew to be the cauſe of your party, and betray your Sovereign?

Far be it from me, Sir, to enter into your ſecret thoughts, or to determine which of the two intereſts you preferred; but it is by their actions that mens intentions are beſt known; and they are the ſubject of the preſent letters.

No, man, it is ſaid, can ſerve two maſters. Yours were ſo directly oppoſite, that in ſerving the one, you muſt neceſſarily betray the other: Which of them you obeyed, the public muſt determine. But ſuppoſing a General to have intended not to execute his truſt, a very ſmall degree of ſagacity will tell him, that he ought to *conceal* his intention. In all common caſes, a General, by kiſſing the King's hand for a command, ſuppoſes that he has thereby pledged his faith for the execution of it; and, conſcious of no reaſon for its being doubted, does not think it neceſſary to ſay very much about his fidelity. You, Sir, at the time you engaged in the King's ſervice, knew alſo your other engagements to your conſtituents, and with an oppoſition who did not wiſh you to execute your commiſſion; and are ſo much the more abundant in your *profeſſions*.

Your

Your *public* letters for the King's inſpection, during the whole time, while you was at Boſton, at Hallifax, in Stadten Iſland, and at New-York, are full of declarations of this ſort. No part of your *private* correſpondence has yet come to light, except that with Mr. Kirk; and we are left to judge of your regard to your other engagements only from your actions. From theſe, Sir, compared with your letters, the great rule, which you appear to have laid down for yourſelf, and to have ſteadily adhered to, through the whole of your command, ſeems to have been, to convince your Sovereign by your letters, that you well knew what you *ought* to do to ſuppreſs the rebellion; — to promiſe to do a great deal; — to ſeem to do ſomething — and really to do nothing.

In all your letters, previous to the opening the campaign of 1776, you are perpetually telling government, that, being ſent to quell a rebellion, it was your buſineſs to wage an offenſive war; and the rebels a defenſive. In your letter from Hallifax the 24th of April, you write, that *nothing was more to be deſired, or ſought for by you, than to bring on a deciſive action; as the moſt effectual means to terminate this expenſive war. And from Stadten Iſland, July 7th, notwithſtanding this good diſpoſition among the people, I am ſtill of opinion, that peace will not be reſtored in America, until the rebel army is defeated.*

Sir, there are two very different motives, to which your chuſing to make theſe, and many other ſuch declarations, have been aſcribed. The

one

one is, that you knew this was your duty, and intended to do it. The other is, that you was ſenſible that every one elſe too knew that this was your duty; and you wiſhed as long as you could to keep off all ſuſpicion, that you intended *not* to do it. Sir, while your letters are continually boaſting, that you would bring the enemy to battle and to *a deciſive action*, your motions are ever calculated to prevent it. And with all your fair promiſes, it was You that protracted the war, and You that avoided a battle, much more carefully than Mr. Waſhington did. And when, to ſave appearances and ſeem to do ſomething, you did begin an action, you invariably took care that it ſhould not be deciſive. After the moſt tedious and affected delays, and haltings half-way, to ſhew the rebels your intention, and give them time to provide againſt it, you ſometimes did expoſe the King's troops to the loſs attending an attack: but invariably called them off upon its ſucceſs; and took care never to expoſe the rebels to the ruin attending a rout and purſuit.

Five times, Sir, even in the beginning of the rebellion, did the rebels ignorance or temerity put them into a ſituation, where they might have been eaſily ſhut up and deſtroyed. Five times did your ſuperior care or tenderneſs leave them a way open for their eſcape. To this end you invariably choſe to attack them on the ſide oppoſite to that, by which only they could retreat; and ſtill more kind to the American brethren, you never once ſuffered

your

your troops to hurry, or diſcompoſe them in going off.

Do you aſk for theſe inſtances? Every one of your actions is a proof of this ſort. At Bunker's-hill, the rebels had been weak enough to incloſe themſelves in a peninſula; the only way out of it was an artificial cauſeway; the water was navigable up to that cauſeway; and you needed only to have landed there, to have ordered them all to lay down their arms, or be cut to pieces. You had a flowing tide, and a fair wind to carry you thither. The other colonies had not then joined, and would have left the Boſtoners to themſelves. Inſtead of ſhutting the rebels up, and marching down upon the back of their intrenchments, without incurring any hazard; you choſe to land and attack them in the front of all their works, and ſacrificed above 1000 of the King's troops, to leave the way open for the rebels to go off without loſs: unmoleſted and unpurſued.

General Clinton adviſed the purſuit; the rebels muſt neceſſarily have been ſtopped at the Narrow-Cauſeway; and one half of them cut to pieces in the confuſion. But that would have been putting an end to the rebellion before it was well begun; and would have nipped all the hopes of your party in the very bud.

Sir, I do not now enter into any of the other hundred errors and neglects of that day. A few of them have been ſtated in Three Letters to Lord Howe, printed for Wilkie. All that I now obſerve is,

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Scale of Miles.
1 2 3 4 5

WHITE PLAINS
New Rochel
Hutchinson River
Meyers Neck
King's Br.
East Chester
Bronxs River
West Chester
Totowa
Passaick River
Saddle River
Hackinsack River
Fort Lee or Ft. Constitution
Ft. Washington
HUDSONS RIVER
NORTH or
NEW YORK ISLAND
Harlem
Frogs Neck
Hell Gate
Manhattan Id.
Hutlith Id.
EAST RIVER
Bloomingdale
Aquakeneck
Hackingsack
Horen's Hook
New Town
Flushing
Ichabod Height
Kepps Bay
Whitstown
Hobock
EAST
JERSEY
Bergen
Paulus Hook
NEWYORK
Bushwick
EAST RIVER
Gouernors Id.
Wallabout Bay
Newark
NEWARK BAY
EAST
JERSEY
Brooklyn
Red Hook
OYSTER BAY
Bedford
Oyster Island
Gowans Cove
LONG ISLAND
Flatt Bush
Elizabeth Town
THE KILLS
Yellow Hook
Flatt Land
Castle Town
STATEN ISLAND
New Utrecht
Narrows
Gravesend
Richmond

is, that the rebels only retreat was to the north-weſt, and your attack was made on the ſouth-eaſt.

Sir, you had two months notice of the rebels intention to poſſeſs themſelves of this hill, as well as of that on Dorcheſter-neck. Had this, however, been a ſingle inſtance, we might have conſidered it as an overſight, and only have been ſorry, that in all that time you had never thought with yourſelf what you ought to do in that caſe. But in my ſubſequent letters I ſhall ſhew, that this is only the firſt of many inſtances, in which you appear to have acted contrary to your own convictions, and the expreſs promiſes of your own letters ſent for his Majeſty's inſpection; ſo many, Sir, that though any one of them might have been placed to inadvertence; yet it is impoſſible to aſcribe that unvaried ſucceſſion of them to ſo innocent a cauſe.

At Long Iſland, the rebels were ſhut up between your army and the ſea, without any poſſible way of eſcape. There therefore you ſent repeated orders not to attack them *at all.* Colonel Monkton, and General Vaughan, who led the grenadiers and light infantry, both of them ſaw and told the advantage. General Vaughan ſtormed with rage at his being ſtopped; and has often openly declared, he ſent you word, that he would force the lines with inconſiderable loſs: you yourſelf acknowledge, that had the troops been permitted to go on, they would have taken the redoubts. This, Sir, is one of thoſe inſtances,

in which the rebels in their beſt writings own, that *their fate hung upon a thread*, and that *they were ſaved, as it were, by miracle.** Miracle it appeared to them. They did not know that your party muſt have died with them.

How very different, Sir, is the language of your actions from that of your letters! On the 7th of June, when you was embarking your little army at Halifax, and then profeſſing to land them in Long Iſland, you tell his Majeſty: "In "the early operations there, I ſhall have the "cloſeſt attention to the reinforcements daily ex- "pected, and not hazard any diſadvantageous at- "tacks.—Should the enemy offer battle in the "open fields, we muſt not decline it. And *from "the high order the troops are now in, I have every "reaſon to flatter myſelf with ſucceſs: which once ob- "tained, and proſecuted immediately upon the arrival of "the reinforcements, would not fail* to have the moſt "intimidating effects upon the minds of thoſe "deluded people." With an army of 8000 men you flatter yourſelf with ſucceſs, againſt the rebel force, when entire; but when that force was routed, and precipitately flying over their trenches, you then, with an army of 18,000 men, repeatedly forbade the following them. Could you think that your army was not in as good ſpirits, and in as *high order*, when they were fluſhed with victory, and were 18,000 ſtrong, as when you

* See the Criſis, No. V. publiſhed in Penſylvania.

had

had with you only the 8000 that you had run away with from Boſton, and had kept three months in danger of ſtarving at Halifax?

But you had loſt three months by going thither, and it was therefore convenient for you, to boaſt of landing in Long Iſland, and of fighting the rebels with your Halifax army only. Yet you lay ſtill for two months longer, and would not venture to land there without your reinforcements. They at length arrived; and with them, on the morning of the 27th of Auguſt, you had gained all the *ſucceſs with which you could flatter yourſelf*. In what manner, Sir, did you fulfill the promiſe made to his Majeſty, that you would *immediately* proſecute that ſucceſs? By ſtanding ſtill for three days, to give the rebels time to ſend every where to collect together boats; and in the courſe of a moonlight night, and of a ſummer's morning, one after another, to ferry themſelves over to New York. And then by ſtanding ſtill for fifteen days longer, to give them time to congratulate each other, as they did, on their not having been all taken and hanged, as they expected; and to recover their ſpirits, and ſtrengthen themſelves in New York, which you was next to attack.

Beſide all the appearances of the foregoing day, you had notice of the rebels going off, ſent you at four o'clock in the morning.* Many of your

* See Montrevor's evidence.

troops were ready; yet you calculated their march of two miles down to the Ferry, ſo very exactly, as to get thither by nine, to ſee the laſt embarkation ſafe on their paſſage.

It may be thought perhaps, that by your victory on the 27th, you did more than *ſeem* to do ſomething. But the completeneſs of that ſucceſs only completes the proof of your intending really and *effectually* to do nothing. — What elſe, Sir, could have prompted your calling back your troops when at the heels of the fugitives, and hiding your victorious army for three days in a hollow way.

The reaſon you give for ſtopping your troops in the midſt of victory, only makes the matter worſe. You would not *riſk the loſs that might have been ſuſtained in the aſſault*. Had any aſſault been neceſſary, you was of opinion it would have ſucceeded; but you had only to have permitted your advanced troops to follow the rebels down to the Ferry, and they muſt all have ſurrendered or been cut to pieces.

Was it, Sir, for the riſk to the King's troops, or to the American Brethren, that you felt yourſelf moſt in fear?

At Bunker's-Hill you ſacrificed a thouſand of them to the leaving open a paſſage for the rebels retreat. At Dorcheſter heighth, you devoted 2,400 of them to the attack of a much ſtronger camp, defended, as you ſay, by 12,000 rebels, fluſhed with ſucceſs: But at Long Iſland you are ſo very tender

der of the King's troops, that you would not riſk the ſmalleſt loſs to take and deſtroy the whole rebel army.

Is there an inſtance, Sir, of a routed army flying precipitately into their trenches, ever ſtanding to defend them? Much leſs of a routed army, after the loſs of great part of their force, and of all their Generals, when purſued by a victorious army of four times their number. But your fits of caution were always ſtrongeſt, when the Americans were weakeſt; and then ſtrongeſt of all, when they were flying without any means of eſcape.

Surely, Sir, you muſt either have held our underſtandings extremely cheap, to think that, when the circumſtances came to be known, we could be put off with ſuch feigned reaſons: or we muſt hold your underſtanding ſtill cheaper, to think that theſe were the real reaſons upon which you acted.

You are now following in peace, what you was moſt averſe to in war, the *Chace.* At the end of your next chace, when the deer is near ſpent, and the dogs are ſtopped, and with *repeated* ratings called off; you will tell us perhaps that this is done, not to ſave the deer for another hunt; but *becauſe you would not riſk the loſs that might be ſuſtained* among the hounds *in the aſſault.*

LETTER II.

SIR,

HAD the intent of theſe letters been merely to point out your miſconduct through the whole period of your command, that would be quite ſuperfluous. It has already been ſo often and ſo clearly proved, that the nation is now fully convinced of it.

But, Sir, the deſign of them is to ſhew, that you acted, not only contrary to the common ſenſe of other men, but contrary to your *own*. To point out, from your own letters, the reaſons there are to fear; that you meant to deceive his Majeſty and the public, by perpetually promiſing to do, what you knew you ought to do; and to ſerve your party by doing only what you knew they wiſhed you to do: that if, with double the force you aſked, the rebellion was not immediately cruſhed; it was not becauſe you did not know the way to do it, but becauſe you *did* know it, and conſtantly choſe to avoid it. In ſhort, that all the calamities the nation now ſuffers in conſequence of the rebellion, are owing to your chuſing to keep it up; and deliberately determining, never to do that, which you yourſelf knew and owned, could only put an end to it.

In my former letter, after ſtating your confeſſed engagements with an oppoſition, whoſe very being depended

depended upon your not cruſhing the rebellion, I have propoſed to ſhew, from the whole tenor of your letters, compared with your actions, that the great rule of your conduct, ſeems to have been, to gain the confidence of your Sovereign by the moſt repeated declarations of your zeal in his ſervice; (that ſervice in which you had firſt promiſed your conſtituents, that you would not accept of a command, and then deſired them to wait the event) and by manifeſting in all your letters before-hand, that you well knew your duty, and what was proper to be done for quelling the rebellion: and for that purpoſe, to promiſe to do a great deal—To ſeem to do ſomething—and really and effectually to do nothing.

In all your letters, previous to the campaign of 1776, both while you was at Boſton, and after you had ſuffered yourſelf to be driven out of it, you are perpetually writing, that nothing was more to be deſired by you, than to bring the rebels to a deciſive action. In words, it is impoſſible for you to expreſs a more determined reſolution to do ſo: By your actions, Sir, it ſeems impoſſible for you to ſhew a more fixed and determined reſolution not to do it. Five times did the rebels put it in your power to ſhut them up, and force them to a deciſive action; five times did your ſuperior care provide a way for them to eſcape without any deciſive action at all. To this end, I have ſaid, you invariably attacked them on the ſide oppoſite to that by which only they could eſcape. Theſe are facts,

Sir,

Sir, which have been already eſtabliſhed by your conduct at Bunker's-Hill, and at Long-Iſland. In the firſt, Colonel Abercrombie ſounded the water near the cauſeway before-hand, as if from a preſentiment of his own and a thouſand other brave men's fall, if you did not go thither. Every mariner in Boſton could have told you there was depth enough even for your armed veſſels and gun-boats, and much more for your flat-boats. But you muſt then have ſhut the rebels up, and not a man of them could have eſcaped. You choſe therefore to attack them on the oppoſite ſide; and left the way open for them to go quietly off.

At Long Iſland your good diſpoſition towards the American brethren was ſtill more apparent; you promiſed his Majeſty, that upon any advantage gained you would purſue the rebels *immediately:* you had gained the *greateſt* advantage; and ſtood ſtill for three days, to give them time to collect their boats, and to take themſelves away from the deſtruction they expected.

There is a third inſtance, in your permitting the rebels to be taken off from Governor's Iſland, in open day light, and in the ſight of your fleet and army, which has been more fully ſtated in Three Letters to Lord Howe, printed for Wilkie. And a fourth, in your landing near the ſouth end of New York Iſland, when the rebels only out-let was to the north, and then ſuffering Putnam with 3000 men to march quietly by you.

But your conduct at White Plains ſeems to be a demonſtration of all that I have ſaid. Your letter

of

of the 16th January, 1776, is written profeſſedly to explain your ideas about the operations of the next campaign; and the force you judged neceſſary to render them effectual. In that letter you write thus: " If a reſpectable ſupply of troops " from Europe does not arrive ſoon in the ſpring, " another defenſive campaign I conclude will be " the conſequence: for by the want of a force to " act early, the rebel army will have full time to " entrench, in every ſtrong poſition their Com- " manders may fix upon: In which caſe, though " we ſhould get poſſeſſion of New York without " reſiſtance, we muſt not expect to carry their " entrenched camps, but with conſiderable loſs. " *Whereas, on the contrary, the army at the opening* " *of the campaign being in force, would probably by* " *rapid movements bring the rebels to an action upon* " *equal terms, before they could cover themſelves by* " *works of any ſignification.*"

You then, Sir, ſpecify the force requiſite for this purpoſe: " I beg leave to remark, that with " a proper army of 20,000 men; having 12,000 " at New York, 6000 at Rhode Iſland, and 2000 " at Halifax, the preſent unfavourable appearance " of things would probably wear a very different " aſpect before the end of the enſuing campaign." I have before quoted two other letters of the like import. Was it poſſible, Sir, for his Majeſty or his miniſters to doubt of the ſincerity of theſe, and many more ſuch repeated declarations? You accordingly gained their full confidence; and, far

from ſtinting you in the force you demanded, inſtead of 20,000 they gave you 30,000;* and inſtead of 12,000 at New York, you had 24,000 to attack the rebels at White Plains. Waſhington, on the other hand, it appears from General Robertſon's evidence, inſtead of 60,000, as you wildly write home, never had above 16,000 men with him: and of theſe, 3300 had, you ſay, been killed and taken at Long Iſland; 300 of them in York Iſland; and 2700 had been left in Fort Waſhington. The remainder that had not deſerted, you yourſelf tell us were diſpirited by their late defeats.

But, Sir, beſide your immenſe ſuperiority of force, the ſituation of the rebel army gave you

* The numbers are taken from your own correſpondence.

Halifax army and garriſon	8000
Firſt diviſion of Heſſians	8200
Guards	1098
Highlanders	3466
Second diviſion of Heſſians	4000
Clinton's corps	3000
Sixty-ſixth regiment	400
Waldeckers	500
German recruits	402
Britiſh	500
Roger's corps and Provincials	1000
Sixteenth and ſeventeenth light dragoons	888
	31454
Deduct for the betrayed into Boſton, by your not fortifying George's Iſland, as you promiſed to do	800
	30654

every

every circumſtance of advantage. The Hudſon's River, and an arm of the ſea called the Eaſt River, contain between them a large peninſula, ſurrounded on the eaſt, weſt, and ſouth ſides, and open only on the north ſide.* The rebels were encamped at Kingſbridge, in the midſt of this peninſula. The troops were embarked, and ſet off early in the morning of the 12th of October. You had only twenty-five miles to go to New Rochelle, where the poſting them on the only outlet, would have given you the entire command of the rebel army.

For eight months together, you had been telling his Majeſty, that your *chief hopes were in bringing the rebels to a deciſive action.* That *nothing was more to be deſired, or ſought for by you, than a deciſive action.* And July 7th, That *you was ſtill of opinion that peace would not be reſtored, till the rebel army was defeated.* True, to the very laſt minute, to the ſame deception, you begin your letter of the 30th of November, with telling his Majeſty: "The "very ſtrong poſitions the enemy had taken on this "iſland, and fortified with incredible labour, de- "termined me to get upon their principal com- "munication with Connecticut, with a view of "forcing them to quit their ſtrong holds in the "neighbourhood of Kingſbridge, and, if poſſible, "*to bring them to action.*"

You knew, Sir, that the road of communication with Connecticut, was by Rochelle; and had

* They who have not Jeffereys's larger map, will find a leſs one before the title page of this pamphlet.

you intended what you wrote, you had only to have landed at Rochelle, as you might have done in five or ſix hours; and have poſted your army to the north of the rebels, and you could not poſſibly have avoided bringing them to action. The efficacy of this meaſure was obvious, and for that reaſon it ſuited you to promiſe his Majeſty that you would do it; but for that very reaſon it ſuited your party, that you ſhould not do it. In conformity therefore to the conſtant courſe of your proceedings, inſtead of landing to the northward of the rebels, to ſhut them in, you ſtopped half way, and let them ſee whither you was going; and at nine o'clock in the morning landed on the remoteſt point of the coaſt, to the ſouthward of them, to let them out. You wrote to his Majeſty, that you was determined to get upon their principal communication with Connecticut: That you knew was by Rochelle: And you landed at Frog's Neck, at the greateſt poſſible diſtance from it; and at a place too, from which you never could march to it. You tell his Majeſty, that you was determined to bring the rebels, if poſſible, to a battle; and you took care to leave open for them the only poſſible road to avoid it. Such, Sir, was the performance of twenty different promiſes, continually repeated in your letters, during the whole courſe of your command.

The two principal requiſites to the ſucceſs of every military operation, are ſecrecy and expedition. You took effectual care that yours ſhould

have

have neither. By ſtopping half way, you told the rebels whither you was going; and by remaining ſix days there, you gave them time to quit their camp, and take themſelves out of danger. This, Sir, is one of your *rapid movements*; by which you promiſed his Majeſty to prevent the rebels from fortifying any new camp. I juſt mention it at preſent, becauſe this landing at Frog's Neck is only the firſt ſtage of your groſs, and, ſeemingly, wilful failures. The merits of the other two (your march to White Plains, and your ſtanding ſtill there three days within cannon ſhot of the rebels, after you had half routed them on the 28th) ſhall be ſtated in their order.

I call them, Sir, *ſeemingly wilful failures*; for unleſs you give better reaſons than you have hitherto done, how is it poſſible for us to judge otherwiſe? The reaſon you give for thus ſtopping half way, is (a pretence you always have at hand) the want of proviſions. The army, you write, *remained in this ſituation, until the ſtores and proviſions could be brought up*. Judge your own ſelf, Sir, whether it is poſſible for us to believe, that you landed at Frog's Neck, inſtead of Rochelle, for want of proviſions. You had a fleet of two or three hundred tranſports, with all their boats, which could have victualled you for ſix months; and yet you could not hold out a voyage of ſix hours. Theſe proviſions and ſtores could have been brought for you to Rochelle, more eaſily than to Frog's Neck. And, if they were landed for you at Frog's Neck,

you

you muſt have ſhipped them again, to be carried for you to Rochelle; for your men, and much more your baggage, could not get out of Frog's Neck by land. You importantly tell us: *All previous arrangements being made*, the army embarked on the 12th of October in flat boats and other craft, and landed at Frog's Neck about nine in the morning. Is it poſſible for us to ſuppoſe, that you, whoſe letters are full of concern about proviſions, could, *with all your previous arrangements*, have embarked your troops ſo utterly deſtitute, as that they could not have held out till dinner time, which would have carried them to Rochelle? General Robertſon tells us, that Lord Amherſt's troops often marched with fourteen days proviſion on their backs Your men had only to ſit at their eaſe, and to be rowed in their flat boats about as far as from London to Graveſend, and yet could not hold out the whole voyage; but, after having been rowed for two or three hours, landed at Frog's Neck, and ſtaid there ſix days to get their breakfaſt. Had you, Sir, given no reaſon at all, your friends might have fancied one for you: but it is impoſſible for us to conceive, that this was your *real* one. You had performed the longeſt, and only difficult part of the voyage, by nine o'clock in the morning. But had you gone on the other ten miles to Rochelle, you might have ſhut up the rebel army, without having given them any warning. And, the North River being guarded by your ſhips, they muſt have laid down their arms, or have fought

you

you under every poſſible diſadvantage: The moſt ſenſible and beſt informed writers * among the rebels acknowledge this, and laugh at you for not having done it. The loyal part of the Americans ſaw, and mourned it. His Majeſty, from all the ſolemn aſſurances of your fidelity, could not but judge, that you would do your beſt in his ſervice: But a leader of the party ſeems to have known you better, when he ſaid of you, "He "is one of us, and will do the Americans no "harm."

* Paine, the Secretary to the Congreſs, in a contemptuous letter to you has theſe words: If, inſtead of waſting your time againſt Long Iſland, you had run up the North River, and landed any where above New York, the conſequence muſt have been, that either you would have compelled General Waſhington to fight you with very unequal numbers, or he muſt have ſuddenly evacuated the city, with the loſs of nearly all the ſtores of the army, or have ſurrendered for want of proviſions. The ſituation of the place naturally producing one or other of theſe events. American Criſis, No. 5.

LETTER

LETTER III.

SIR,

I NOW proceed to conſider your march to White Plains: but muſt firſt mention an anecdote, which is well worthy recording.

There is an Engliſh gentleman now in England, who on the 12th of October 1776, had a New York barber with him, dreſſing his hair, juſt at the time, when the news was brought freſh into the room, that the General had landed that morning at Frog's Neck.—At Frog's Neck! ſaid the barber—*Then he will do nothing.* We, who are unacquainted with the country, may wonder at the barber's ſagacity. But had we been natives of New York, and known, as they did, the marſhes and river between Frog's Neck and Cheſter, which made it impracticable for an army to march out of it, we might, any of us, without being ſoldiers, have been able to ſay the ſame thing. Should any Gentlemen wiſh to perſuade themſeves, that this was a ſimple error; and that a great General did not ſee, in a deliberation of ſix weeks, what a New York barber ſaw in ſix ſeconds, I leave them to mourn for his ignorance; and wiſh, that the man, who dreſſed my friend's head, had had the dreſſing of the General's.

Sir, it would doubtleſs be for the credit of your integrity; if we could believe, that you was not aware

aware of the conſequences of what you did: But your own letters are a bar to every ſuppoſition of that ſort. Theſe, Sir, prove, that you *knew* the right thing, though you never *did* it. In theſe, you are ever talking of bringing the rebels to a deciſive action, as the only means of terminating an expenſive war; but though you have this ever in your mouth, you ſeem never to have found it in your heart. The conſtant rule of your conduct ſeems to have been, to make uſe of every means, every delay, every pretext, to prevent the bringing them to a battle. And where you could not decently avoid it, invariably to call off your troops, upon the firſt appearance of its becoming deciſive.

In your preſent Letter, you tell his Majeſty, that, "with a view of forcing the rebels to quit "their ſtrong holds in the neighbourhood of "King's Bridge, you determined to get upon their "principal communication with Connecticut; and, "if poſſible, bring them to a battle." You had only to have done what you profeſſed, and landed to the northward of them; and you had ſhut them up, without a poſſibility of their avoiding a battle: and that under all the diſadvantages you might pleaſe to lay in their way, to make it certainly deciſive. Inſtead of this, you landed to the ſouth of them; and left open the only road to the northward, for them to move off without any battle at all.

You told his Majeſty, that you was going to get upon the rebels principal communication with Connecticut; and you landed your troops at the greateſt poſſible diſtance from that road of communication: and in an iſland too, out of which there was no paſſage for you to march to it.

Still, Sir, there remained one promiſe, upon which you had ſo largely dilated, and had laid ſo great a ſtreſs, as might make us hope, that that at leaſt would be fulfilled by you.

I have already obſerved, that in your letter of the 16th of January, profeſſedly ſtating your ideas about the operations of the next campaign, you point out the miſchief of giving the rebels time to entrench in every ſtrong poſition their commander may fix upon; and then tell his Majeſty, that if he will furniſh you with a proper army of 20,000 men; 12,000 at New York, 6000 at Rhode Iſland, and 2000 at Halifax; your army would probably, by *rapid movements*, bring the rebels to an action upon equal terms, before they could cover themſelves by works of any ſignification. Sir, the 6000 for Rhode Iſland were ſtill with you at New York; and inſtead of 12,000, you had more than 24,000 with you to act againſt a beaten army of 10,000; which you yourſelf own, *were diſpirited by their late defeats.*

You knew, Sir, for you yourſelf tell us, that as ſoon as the rebels ſhould learn, that you was coming round them to cut off their communication by Rochelle, they would be *forced* to quit their camp

camp at King's Bridge, and to ſeek for ſome other. Here, therefore, was the very caſe actually before you, in which you had promiſed his Majeſty that "your army ſhould, by rapid movements, bring the "rebels to action upon equal terms, before they could "cover themſelves by works of any ſignification." And what were your rapid movements for this purpoſe? You was ſixteen days in moving eighteen miles. This, Sir, is your own account, or it could ſcarce have been believed. But having made it your firſt care, not to ſhut the rebels up by landing at Rochelle; your next, in defiance of all your promiſes, ſeems to have been, to give them full time, after quitting their old camp, to fortify ſome new one. The diſtance from Frog's Neck to White Plains is eighteen miles; and the ten moſt difficult, you might have gone by water in half a tide. After having diſgraced the King's army, by putting it into a pound, of which they found the rebels had the lock and key; it might have been expected, that you would have taken the firſt opportunity to get out of it. Inſtead of this, Sir, what did you do? You kept the troops ſix days there doing of nothing; but only giving the rebels time to do what they pleaſed. And then, at length, when you was forced to re-embark them; inſtead of rowing the whole ten miles to Rochelle, you ſet them aſhore again for another half-way halt; and employed three days more in going by land, what could not have taken them three hours in their boats. I ſay nothing of the numbers that were

ſhot from the woods, and from behind ſtone walls, in this unneceſſary march. Captain Evelyn and Colonel Muſgrave were among thoſe that fell: the former died the next day; but Colonel Muſgrave happily ſurvived, to ſave your army the next campaign, when you ſuffered yourſelf to be ſurpriſed at Germantown.

The carrying of your army quietly in their boats to Rochelle in two or three hours, ſeems to have been judged too expeditious for your purpoſe. The troops could not lie ſtill for three days in their boats; but it would be eaſy to find a pretence for that delay at land. After putting them aſhore, therefore, on the 18th, they took their ſtation, and remained there till the 21ſt. They then made another march of three or four miles, and reſted three days more. On the 25th you made another forced march, of two or three miles more; and after another halt, till the 28th, you then at length made an appearance of bringing the rebels to battle. This, Sir, is your own journal of your rapid movements. From the 12th of October to the 28th, you rowed and marched by land and by water, eighteen miles in ſixteen days.

The Duke of Marlborough, intending really to cut off the French communication, and bring them to a battle, marched an army three times as great as yours fourteen miles, threw bridges over the Scheld, and won the battle of Oudendard, all in one day. But he, Sir, meant really to ſerve his country, and to beat his enemies. I do not ſay what were your intentions:

intentions: but if you had meant to ſave the rebels and ruin your country, you could not have taken any method of doing it more effectual.

What benefit you could propoſe by your delays for the *King's ſervice*, we are yet to learn: What was the uſe the *rebels made of it*, your Letter tells us: "Upon the movement of the army to Frog's "Neck, the enemy quitted their poſition at King's "Bridge, and formed a number of detached camps "along the Brunx, every where entrenched; and "ſent off a detached corps to fortify a yet ſtronger "camp at White Plains," as a laſt reſort for them without the peninſula.

Sir, we not only learn from your Letters, that this was the conſequence of your delays, but we learn too from your Letters, that you knew before hand, that this would be the conſequence. And after promiſing his Majeſty, that your movements ſhould be ſo *rapid* as to prevent the rebels from fortifying any one camp; you took care to make them ſo extremely torpid, as to allow the rebels to fortify a number of camps, and to entrench where-ever they pleaſed.

Such, Sir, has been the unvaried courſe of your proceedings. You knew the conſequences of your delays: You knew the means to prevent the rebels from fortifying: You promiſed his Majeſty that you would prevent them: And, during your whole command, you did juſt the contrary. Think then, what muſt be the concluſion we are led from thence to infer. I do not ſay, Sir, that you be-

trayed

trayed the cauſe of your country: But it greatly imports you to clear up your conduct, in a much more ſatisfactory manner than you have hitherto done, to prevent every one elſe from concluding it.

Sir, I have already recited the promiſe you made to his Majeſty, that if you was furniſhed with a proper force, you would by your *rapid movements* prevent the rebels from fortifying their camps. You was furniſhed with double the force you aſked; and when you knew that the rebels muſt quit their old camp at King's Bridge, and find out a new one, you was ſixteen days in going eighteen miles. By two embarkations and debarkations, you contrived to waſte away ſix days, from the 12th of October to the 18th, in doing of nothing; and your ſubſequent motions were ſo extremely torpid, that they cannot bear the term of marching: you was ten days, Sir, in crawling the laſt ten miles. At length, however, as Waſhington had no more fortified camps, and would go no farther, you could not help coming up with him on the 28th. Then at leaſt we might have hoped you would bring them to that deciſive action you had ſo often promiſed. Your behaviour there, Sir, makes the third ſtage of your groſs and ſeemingly wilful failures in this affair.

Hitherto I have not controverted the repreſentations you perpetually make of the ſtrength of the rebel camps, and the ſtrong works by which they were fortified. And yet, Sir, of all the ſtrong holds

holds in this very ſtrong country, as you and your witneſſes have repreſented it, the rebels never found *one*, which the King's troops did not force; whenever you was pleaſed to give them leave to attack it. If any one of the rebels poſts could anſwer the formidable deſcription you chuſe to make of them, it ſhould have been this at White Plains. By landing half way you had given them notice of your coming, and ſixteen days leiſure to prepare for your reception: And yet, Sir, this highly fortified camp, this ſtrongeſt of their ſtrong holds, would not have ſerved to protect them a ſingle hour longer than you choſe to permit the King's troops to attack it. And although in your cuſtomary manner you kept back your troops in the midſt of victory, and ſtopped them as ſoon as the battle was like to prove deciſive, yet the rebels did not dare to truſt themſelves in this camp for a ſingle night.

Sir, this is your own account, and cannot be controverted. Your own letter tells us, that on "the 28th, at the end of your ten days crawl, be-"fore noon all the enemies advanced parties were "driven back to their works: That Colonel Raille "and his Heſſian brigade, with great alacrity, had "taken poſſeſſion of a height, *from whence the rebels* "*flank might be galled.*" From your own letter it appears, that "Leſlie's brigade, and the Heſſian "grenadiers under Donop, paſſed the Brunx, and "formed on the other ſide, though under the "enemies fire, with the greateſt ſteadineſs aſcend-"ed the ſteep hill, in defiance of all oppoſition; "and,

" and, ruſhing on the enemy, routed, and drove " them back from their works. That this mate- " rial poſt being gained, the Heſſian grenadiers " were ordered forward, within cannon ſhot of " the entrenchments." The Heſſian troops there- fore had got poſſeſſion of two importrnt heights, from whence you tell us the rebels flank might be galled. Other accounts, Sir, ſay, that they ac- tually were galled by four pieces of Heſſian can- non, with ſo great effect, that you yourſelf was galled with ſeeing the execution they did among the American brethren, and ſent to ſtop their firing.

Be that as it may, here was the enemy's right flank laid open to your attack, their routed troops were flying before you ; the victory hung balancing in your own hands: when, juſt as you did at Brooklyn, you ſtopped the ardour of your troops ; and, finding that the action was likely to grow de- ciſive, you choſe to give the rebels a night's lei- ſure, to recover from their fright, and retire from the expoſed part of their camp, and fortify them- ſelves in a new poſition, out of the reach of the heights you had gained from them. And then, Sir, in the morning, finding they had ſo well im- proved the reſpite you allowed them, you reſolved to give them two days more, under pretence of ſending to York for five more regiments. Theſe regiments, Sir, came from York to White Plains the next day, though you choſe to make it a crawl of ſixteen days.

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The ſending for theſe regiments gave you the appearance of doing ſomething, while you really did nothing: for you made no uſe of them, when they were come; but choſe to ſtand ſtill, and give the Americans another day's reflection. And then, at laſt, you gained theſe lines, at the ſame *cheap rate* as you did thoſe at Brooklyn; by waiting three days till the rebels ſhould be pleaſed to march off, and leave them to you. All this is your own account, Sir, and carries with it the ſtrongeſt conviction. While you, for three days, was ſeeking every pretence for delaying (or in your own terms, as if a battle like a motion in parliament could be brought on any day you pleaſed) for *poſtponing* the attack, you tell us: "In the mean time, the re-"bels having intelligence by a deſerter of their "danger, *moſt prudently* evacuated their camp in "the night of the 1ſt of November; the poſſeſ-"ſion of which was immediately taken, *and the* "*Heſſian grenadiers remained upon the ground.*" Did you then expect that we ſhould not aſk ourſelves, how you could poſſibly come to the knowledge of this intelligence? Waſhington ſurely did not ſend it you; and the deſerter did not come back to tell it you. It could therefore be only a ſubject of conjecture. But knowing your own vaſt ſuperiority, and the danger the rebels incurred by ſtaying where they were; you take it for granted, that this deſerter informed them of it; and tell us, that thereupon the next night they *moſt prudently* moved off. Still more, Sir, this danger the rebels were in, muſt

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have been not only known to *you*, but you muſt have thought it ſo very apparent, as to be viſible to every man in your army, as well as to yourſelf; elſe you could not have ſuppoſed, that a common deſerter could tell it. If, therefore, it was ſo dangerous for the enemy to ſtay, and ſo very prudent for them to move off, what then, Sir, are we to think of a General, who knowing this danger, and having twice in his letter told his Majeſty, that he would, if poſſible, bring them to battle, deliberately reſolved not to do it; and for three days together, pretending on each day that he would fight them the next, wilfully ſtood ſtill; till on the fourth night they ſhould move off without his fighting them at all? *

To complete the abſurdity, you go on, "All "theſe motions plainly indicating the enemies "deſign to avoid coming to action, I did not "think the driving their rear guard farther back "an object of the *leaſt conſequence.*" Sir, every General, who means to ſerve his country, knows, that his enemies wiſhing to avoid a battle, is the ſtrongeſt reaſon for him to preſs them ſo much the more. You, Sir, as if you wiſhed to convict yourſelf of treachery, as well as abſurdity, give this as a reaſon for letting them quietly go off: and now tell us in fact, that all your repeated declarations

* The reader will find this whole ſubject more fully explained in Obſervations on the Conduct at White Plains, ſold by Wilkie. Its here conſidered, only as a proof of the General's promiſing one thing, and doing the direct contrary.

of

of bringing on a deciſive action, as the only means of terminating the war, were of little weight in your eſtimation, when ſet againſt the wiſhes of the American brethren to protract the war, and avoid coming to any action at all.

They who know the country, know, that had you choſen to purſue, the rebels muſt have been ſhut up between the Hudſon's River on their left, and the Croton River in their front; while your left was in their rear, and your right was as near the Croton Bridge as the rebels were. They could not all get over this ſingle bridge at once, and ſome muſt ſtay behind. Theſe fugitives were what you call their *ſtrong rear guard.* But the American brethren as little wiſhed to be routed and drowned in the Croton River, as they did to be attacked and ſlaughtered at White Plains; and you mercifully granted them a reprieve in both.

Sir, I do not mean to ſuppoſe, that there was actually any ſuch private agreement: But if Waſhington and you had had as good an underſtanding together, about their leaving their camp at White Plains, as there was between you on your leaving of Boſton, you could not have acted together in ſtricter concert. He, it ſeems, quitted his camp, and let you lie in it a night or two; and then you quitted it, and let him come there again for as long as he pleaſed. This, Sir, is your own account: And thus the rebels, through your goodneſs, in neither attacking nor purſuing them, loſt nothing; and you gained a pretence for clapping your wings as for a victory, and for crowing in

your letter home, that *the Heſſian grenadiers encamped upon the ground.*

Surely, Sir, this is the mere mockery of war, and not the reality. But the more melancholy part remains ſtill to be told: At Boſton you carried the loyal part of the inhabitants with you: At White Plains you abandoned them to the mercy of the rebels. From General Robinſon's evidence it appears, that the loyal inhabitants of the two Chester counties, not doubting, but that with your vaſt victorious army you would ſoon rout, and drive the rebels far enough from them, preſented addreſſes of thanks for their deliverance from the Congreſs tyranny. Theſe addreſſes were printed in the New York Gazette, with the names of all the ſubſcribers. Little, Sir, could theſe loyaliſts ſuſpect, that you would content yourſelf with ſuffering the rebels, without doing them any hurt, to retire only three or four miles for a few days; and that they were then to be permitted to come back to wreak their fury on them; pointed out by name too, for the ſurer victims of their vengeance.

Your letter goes on: *When this movement was made* (that is, when you had turned back, towards New York, and abandoned them,) *the rebels came down from their ſtrong holds, burning what they had not before deſtroyed at White Plains, and diſtreſſing the inhabitants by ſmall parties, in a moſt wanton degree.* Sir, they had no ſtrong holds; and could have none, if you would have been pleaſed to purſue them

them immediately upon their flight. Could they have fortified a camp, with your victorious army cloſe at their heels? Yet after ſeeing all theſe acts of cruelty committed, in conſequence of your not purſuing them, and leaving them in their full force to come back again, you tell us, with ſtill more unfeeling cruelty, "All theſe motions plainly in-"dicating the enemy's deſign not to come to a "battle, *I did not think the driving their rear guard* "*farther back an object of the leaſt conſequence.*"

Sir, It is impoſſible to enter into any political reaſon, you pretend to have had for not purſuing the advantages you had gained on the 28th; becauſe this political reaſon, though you have ſince repreſented it in the Houſe of Commons as of ſo great importance, yet at the time when it happened appeared of ſo very little importance, that you did not think it worth the mentioning to his Majeſty's Secretary of State; nor do they know what it was to this hour. A political reaſon, had it been good for any thing, muſt have been the laſt thing you ought to have concealed from the King's Miniſters. Whatever it may have been, we muſt at leaſt conclude, that it is of as little importance now, as you yourſelf judged it to be then.

Should any thing be inſinuated about the Heſſians; every reflection of that ſort is fully refuted by your own letter. One ſingle regiment (I think of Loſburgh) refuſed to march without their cannon; and this probably makes the whole of your political reaſon. But from your own account it appears,

appears, that the only action there was, was on your left, where the Heſſians were; and that the principal ſervices performed on that day, were performed by the Heſſians.

Sir, I do not intend to follow you croſs the Hudſon's River into the Jerſeys, although there too you diſcovered the ſame anxious precaution to let the rebels eſcape with impunity.

After the taking of Fort Lee, Waſhington, with the broken remains of his army, had ſixty miles to get to his magazines at Brunſwick, and your troops in Stadten Iſland, had only ten miles to go thither from Amboy. General Robinſon, and the common ſenſe of every man who looks at the map, tells us, that one half of the troops, which were doing nothing in Stadten-Iſland, might eaſily have taken poſſeſſion of Brunſwick, and effectually cut off the rebels retreat. You had it in your *choice* to ſend them up the Rariton by land or by water; but it was in your *inclination* to do neither: for with Lord Cornwallis purſuing them in their rear, and this body meeting them in their front, you muſt have put them between two fires, and compleated their deſtruction.

After this, you tell us in your letter, that had "not the rebels prevented the paſſage of the Ra-"riton, by breaking part of Brunſwick-Bridge, ſo "great was the confuſion among them, that their "army muſt inevitably have been cut to pieces."

Sir, Lord Cornwallis was not ſtopped by the breaking of the bridge, but by your orders not to

purſue

purſue beyond the Rariton: and theſe orders were given long before the breaking of that bridge. At Brunſwick you kept Lord Cornwallis ſix days, to give the rebels time to carry off their ſtores, and to provide all the neceſſary craft for their quietly paſſing over the Delaware without interruption; juſt in the ſame indulgent manner, as the Admiral and you permitted them to paſs at Brooklyn Ferry, at Hudſon's River, and every where elſe where they choſe.

Here at Brunſwick, Sir, I leave you. Your ſubſequent conduct, in the remainder of this, and during the next campaign, have been too clearly explained by an eye-witneſs, who here met you, to leave a doubt about your conduct. And Mr. Galloway's evidence would have been confirmed by many other witneſſes, if you and your party had not begged to cloſe the inquiry.

I have now Sir, offered the reaſons, which, upon a fair collation of your letters with your conduct, create ſo ſtrong a ſuſpicion of duplicity: And I leave you to make your option; whether to juſtify your integrity in the diſcharge of the truſt committed to you; or to value yourſelf with oppoſition on your fidelity to your party. On either ſide you will find very great difficulties and diſcouragements. Should you chuſe to maintain your integrity, and ſay that you did your beſt in the King's ſervice, your own letters flatly contradict you, and undeniably prove that you knew better. Unleſs therefore, you can produce ſome more ſatisfactory

defence,

defence, than you have hitherto done, it will be difficult for you to find an honeſt and intelligent man to believe you. If, on the other hand, you wiſh to ſhelter yourſelf under the merit of fidelity to your party, your already known private engagements, and your whole public conduct will certainly entitle you to this merit. But there too you will meet with as little protection, for though every one will *believe* you, you will hardly find any one to *thank you*. Even bad men, while they gladly avail themſelves of the treaſon, deſpiſe the traitor. Under this option, and with theſe your choſen aſſociates, I leave you, to the juſt deteſtation of all honeſt men, for having ſacrificed your faith, your honour, and your intereſt, your ſovereign, and your country, to the narrow views of a party: and to the reſpectful contempt of your own betrayers, for having yielded yourſelf an eaſy dupe to their intereſted illuſions.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX.

MR. KIRK's Letter, and the General's Anſwer, were firſt publiſhed in the London Evening Poſt of the 23d of April, 1778; are dated in February, 1775, and have never been diſowned. They are lately republiſhed in the Reply to Sir William Howe's Obſervations (printed for Wilkie). The extreme defect of Grammar in the part I have quoted, ſhews the wretched figure the General's defence muſt have made, if he had not had his hired ſecretary to write it for him. Yet this gentleman and his brother affect to talk with contempt of other gentlemen, once their equals in fortune though not in rank, and to call them *hired writers*.

The two following letters are reprinted, as ſpecimens of the eaſy refutation which might be given to many other bold and unfounded aſſertions, put into the General's narrative.

LETTER I.

SIR,

AS Sir William Howe has now made his appeal to the public, by printing his narrative, and has thereby revived a ſubject, which he ſhould have wiſhed us, if poſſible, to forget, I ſhall occaſionally

caſionally ſend you ſome ſtrictures on the more material parts of his defence.

He begins with his evacuation of Boſton, and tells us, page 3, "It has not been inſinuated, that "any diſgrace was brought upon his Majeſty's "arms by the manner in which that town was "evacuated."

Had this gentleman thought fit to obey the King's orders, and voluntarily evacuated Boſton in November 1775, when he had fewer troops, and more ſhipping, than he took with him in his flight on the 14th of March, 1776, he might have ſaid ſomething of this ſort. But does he think it no diſgrace brought upon his Majeſty's arms, to have his troops driven out of it by *force?* Does he think it no diſgrace, after having ſo ſeverely felt what the rebels had done at Bunker's Hill, to have neglected every precaution to ſecure the heights of Dorcheſter Neck, which the inhabitants of Boſton knew, and he could not but ſee, were of ſo much more dangerous importance? Does he think it no diſgrace to have ſuffered Mr. Waſhington, by the works of a ſingle night, to drive him out of a town, which, at an immenſe expence to the public, he had been fortifying during the whole time of his command? Has he forgotten his vaunting letter of the 26th of November, when in reply to the King's order to leave Boſton, and to go to the ſouthward, he writes home: "We are not under "the leaſt apprehenſions of any attack upon this "place from the rebels, from ſurprize or other-

"wiſe,

" wiſe, as taken notice of in your Lordſhip's let-
" ter. On the contrary, it were to be wiſhed,
" that they would attempt ſo raſh a ſtep, and quit
" thoſe ſtrong entrenchments, to *which alone they*
" *may attribute their preſent ſecurity.*" And does he think it no diſgrace, after having been thus prodigal of his boaſts, to have been ſo groſſly outgeneralled by an enemy, whom he affected ſo much to deſpiſe? to have had his wiſh, and in conſequence of it, to have ſeen all his nine months labours rendered uſeleſs in nine hours? and the royal army reduced to ſuch a ſtate, as that he did not dare to ſtrike a ſingle ſtroke for it's defence?* To any other General this would have appeared a diſgrace to have been felt for life; but Sir William Howe's happy inſenſibility feels it none.

Still more to complete the rebel triumph, and the full meaſure of diſgrace to his Majeſty's arms, he did not even quit the town, but under Waſhington's permiſſion. The King's General aſſented to the entering into a ſecret clandeſtine capitulation with the rebels, for leave to go out; upon condition of his not hurting the town. Yet far from feeling the leaſt degree of ſhame at having thus ſtained the honour of his troops and of his Sovereign, he hoped it would remain concealed; and boaſtingly writes home, that *he had accompliſhed the arduous taſk, and had executed the evacuation without*

* See his whining letter of the 21ſt of March, ſo very different from the confident boaſts in that of the 26th of November.

the leaſt moleſtation from the rebels. Aſcribing it al to his own proweſs, though he knew that the rebels ſuffering him quietly to go off, was in conſequence of that clandeſtine agreement. After having diſcovered to Mr. Waſhington this ſolicitude to get his leave to go off unmoleſted, we eaſily account for his putting a ſtop to the carrying off the ſtores of the diſaffected townſmen, and his leaving ſo vaſt a proportion of the King's ſtores for the uſe of his conquerors.

Reader, all theſe accumulated diſgraces have, from different quarters, been pointed out to him ten times over; and he has been publicly charged with them in the *plaineſt terms*. Yet he now wipes his mouth, and deliberately tells us, "it has not "been *inſinuated*, that any diſgrace was brought "upon his Majeſty's arms, by the manner in "whichthat town was evacuated."

LETTER II.

SIR William Howe, when he reſolved, in direct breach of the King's orders, to carry his army away to Halifax, inſtead of going to the ſouthward, could at that time think of no other pretence for his diſobedience, but *his troops being crouded in the tranſports, and the diſſortment of his ſtores.* This might have carried the appearance of an excuſe, if the places to the ſouthward, to which he was ordered, had been fortified and garriſoned. But Rhode Iſland, Long Iſland, Staten Iſland, and York Iſland, were at that time incapable of oppoſing his landing; and he might have arranged his troops, and ſorted his ſtores, at any of thoſe places, much better than at Halifax.

Finding, therefore, that this pretence was too eaſily ſeen through, he now in his narrative wiſhes to amend his plea, and gives us three other reaſons or advantages in his going thither. The army, he tells us, (page 4) "by going thither, received "great benefit, not only from neceſſary refreſh-"ments, but from the opportunity of being ex-"erciſed in line; a very material part of diſcipline, "in which it was defective until that time."

That the troops could not draw up and exerciſe in line in the ſtreets of Boſton, is moſt certain; but how material ſoever a part of diſcipline this may be, it is difficult to diſcern how the General would make this obſervation ſubſervient to h. purpoſe.

purpoſe. Did he think, or does he expect that we ſhould think, that this could not have been practiſed in Rhode Iſland, Long Iſland, or even Staten Iſland? or that he could not have found any piece of ground in America, big enough to draw up five or ten thouſand men upon, except only at Halifax?

The other reaſons here aſſigned are ſtill more contemptible. *The army*, he tells us, *received great benefit from neceſſary refreſhments.* By flying from Boſton, and going to Halifax, the army was indeed refreſhed from the ſtink of the rebel cannon; but it is not eaſy to conceive any other refreſhment. In point of quarters it could be no great refreſhment, to go from one of the largeſt towns in America, to one of the leaſt; where the troops were kept on ſhip-board ſtived up one upon another, and the officers, and poor refugees, paid triple price for the meaneſt holes they could put their heads in. Much leſs could theſe refreſhments be in point of proviſions; for the General himſelf tells us, that Halifax had been previouſly ſtripped of them; and he left behind him, at Boſton, a much greater quantity of forage, and proviſions, for the uſe of the rebel army, than he found at Halifax for the uſe of the King's troops.

Whatever, therefore, were theſe neceſſary refreſhments, they muſt have been found out ſince the General's return to England; for his own letter, of the 21ſt of March, tells us, that Halifax had not only been ſtripped of proviſions during the winter,

but

but that it afforded few conveniences to ſo numerous a body; and his ſubſequent letters are full of complaints for want of them; and ſhew, that the army was in perpetual danger of ſtarving all the while they remained there.

The laſt benefit the General mentions is, "that "the troops performed very eſſential ſervice at "Halifax, by conſtructing redoubts, and other "ſtrong works for the defence of the town and "dock, which could not have been executed by "the garriſon." If the General had gone to Rhode Iſland or New York in November, when he was ordered, and when there was nothing to oppoſe him in thoſe places, his army might have been uſefully employed in ſuch works, for it's better ſecurity; but unluckily Halifax at this time was the laſt place that needed them: for long before this the General, having in a former letter mentioned the additional works which had been made there, and in his letter of the 3d of December, the addition making to the garriſon, writes, "*and with* "*this reinforcement I muſt conclude that place is in* "*perfect ſecurity.*"

Under this concluſion therefore, that the place was already in perfect ſecurity, he took the King's army 600 miles out of their way, loſt a great part of the next campaign, and a thouſand of the King's troops, in order to put it into a ſtate of *more* than perfect ſecurity.

So long as a gentleman is ſilent, and does not attempt to give reaſons for his conduct, we cannot be

be abſolutely certain that he had none: But when he has publiſhed his reaſons, we are then maſters of both ſides of the ſubject; and in this caſe can have no doubt in our deciſion upon the merits. He carried his army to Halifax for *refreſhments*, where he tells us beforehand that there were *none*. He carried his army to Halifax, rather than where he was ordered, for room to exerciſe them in the line; which he could have done any where elſe much better than at Halifax. He carried his whole army to a place, which he told us three months before was in perfect ſecurity, in order to put it in a ſtate of *more* than perfect ſecurity. Could the gentleman's worſt *enemy* have ſet his conduct in ſo contemptible a light, as his friend, who could put into his hand ſuch a narrative as this, to read to the Houſe of Commons, and aſſign ſuch deſpicable reaſons for his breach of the King's orders.

FINIS.